Introduction
The main purpose of this article is to investigate the political context of the decision to increase Northern Ireland's representation in the house of commons at Westminster from 12 members to 17 in 1978-9. It will shed light on the way that issues concerning Northern
Ireland following the suspension of the Stormont parliament in 1972 (and its dissolution in 1973), in particular efforts to bring peace, could coincide and overlap significantly with questions of constitutional change (devolution) for Scotland and Wales, and suggest that the UK's constitutional debates of this decade cannot be properly understood without the Northern Ireland dimension. In addition, the article will examine the political manoeuvring around the issue of the increase in Northern Ireland MPs and its centrality to the working arrangement reached between the Callaghan Labour government and the Ulster Unionists from the spring of 1977 to the end of the government in 1979.
The article will first provide some background to the controversy of the Northern Ireland increase by discussing briefly the history of relations between the Stormont parliament and Westminster, and the way that the issue of representation -later to become known as the 'West Lothian Question' during the debates on devolution for Scotland and Wales -manifested itself when Northern Ireland, in the period between 1921 and 1972, was the sole part of the UK to experience devolution.
An Uneasy Relationship: Interactions between Stormont and Westminster, 1921-72
Between the birth in 1921 of Northern Ireland as a devolved unit of government and the turbulence of the 1960s, relations between Belfast and London were, for the most part, quietly harmonious. Between 1921 and 1940, when Prime Minister Lord Craigavon's Unionist regime held power in Stormont, devolution was not used in order to diverge significantly from Britain -indeed Craigavon's governments attempted as much as possible to affirm the province's British identity through the constitutional arrangements that Unionists had been given. For example, a 'step-by-step' process was implemented in relation to social services as a means of minimising the disjunctive effects of devolution, namely the detachment of Northern Ireland politically from Westminster and the British party system. 1 While those in power in Northern Ireland balanced the promotion of a unique Ulster identity with an obligation to ensure that their constituents were socially on a par with those on the mainland, members of parliament from Northern Ireland holding seats in the Westminster house of commons were able to vote on social and political matters which affected only those living in England, Scotland and Wales. For the 50-year period when Northern Ireland possessed devolution, the MPs returned to Westminster were overwhelmingly Unionists, and, except on rare occasions, chose to take the Conservative whip. These MPs, as Jackson points out, were not delegates of the Unionist government in Belfast, and relations between the two were often tense and problematic, especially following the Second World War. 2 The anomaly of the Ulster MPs voting at Westminster on non-Ulster matters, re- Woodrow Wyatt and Desmond Donnelly, oppose his steel plans, leading him initially to back down rather than jeopardise his thin majority. 4 Frustrated by Unionists potentially setting up another obstacle to his ambitions, Wilson asked his attorney general, Elwyn Jones, to devise an 'in and out' solution to the seeming incongruity of Northern Irish MPs at Westminster assisting in the buffering of a proposed legislative process which was outside their constitutional area of concern. A similar 'in and out' solution had been proposed during the time of Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill of the late 19th century. The proposal then, which was eventually thought to be unworkable and dropped, would have allowed Irish MPs to vote on 'imperial' issues but not on those of domestic concern to Great Britain. 5 Mackintosh, addressing Crossman, went on:
You cannot suggest a different and harsher rule should apply to Scottish members. It is on this ground among others that English members serve on the Scottish Grand Committee. If there was ever a specialist committee on the Scottish Office, I would oppose it being confined solely to Scots MPs. If this rule was established, it would exclude Scottish members from serving on specialist committees on health, housing and local government, home office affairs, and education as all these have a sub-section in the Scottish Office. Also some of the most useful work comes from comparisons of the experience of very similar problems handled in slightly different ways by the Scottish and the relevant English Department. 19 For Harold Wilson, the Ulster Unionist MPs' behaviour remained a sore point, and he was to return to the theme when the civil rights agitation convulsed Northern Ireland in late 1968. Jackson has even speculated that he may have been hinting at a deal over the issue in the context of supporting the O'Neill government through its difficulties. 20 By this time,
Wilson was also facing a Nationalist challenge in Scotland and Wales, to which he responded by setting up a royal commission on the constitution. 21 Significantly, Northern Ireland was included within the remit of the enquiry, and O'Neill even influenced decisions on the commission's terms of reference. 22 The commission's deliberations were to have far-reaching consequences as constitutional matters shaped the political and parliamentary agenda of the following decade.
The Political Significance of Northern Ireland Representation at Westminster, 1972-9
The focused on the anomalies of the 'direct rule' system of government. 41 The and he hoped to distance the Northern Ireland problem from other UK matters such as devolution for Scotland and Wales. 45 However, this proved difficult in practice.
For the constitutional convention elections of May 1975, the UUUC produced a manifesto, the first demand of which was 'Full representation in the Parliament of the United Kingdom' which was defined as 21 seats, the same in proportion to population as Scotland.
Second, the UUUC demanded a 'democratically elected Parliament with a system of government broadly in line with the provisions to be made for constitutional devolution in the United Kingdom as a whole'. The manifesto went on to reject any 'artificial device' for giving any political party or interest a larger share of representation, influence or power than it was entitled to by virtue of electoral support, and any imposed 'Irish Dimension'. work with regarding the prospect of a truly consensus-based government. 49 The convention was finally wound up in March 1976.
At one point in the summer of 1975, the convention appeared to witness growing agreement across traditional and political divides with much good humour and a genuine desire to prove that politics could trump violence. The common points were resentment over the role of ill-informed English politicians and government officials, and of inadequate arrangements for Northern Ireland business at Westminster, and the belief that 'Ulstermen' knew best how to deal with their problems. 50 The convention, indeed, did appear to supply evidence of the 'Ulster Nationalism' detected by Merlyn Rees, 51 'magnets' such as the promise of an increase in MPs, to lure the local Ulster politicians into dialogue. 63 The matter also landed at the door of the lord president, Michael Foot, responsible for managing the government's legislative programme. 64 In a memorandum, Foot acknowledged that the Northern Ireland case had to be considered in the context of any change brought about by the devolution legislation, but stressed that Labour's own party interest would be best served by 'the minimum change from the current relativities between the four countries'.
Foot's preferred option was a Speaker's conference to consider the representation issue in the round if devolution came into effect for Scotland and/or Wales. weakening in the resolve to restore devolved government; in particular it might be portrayed as a move towards integration. ' The writer of the memorandum reflected the extent to which the matter had proved politically vexatious at a sensitive juncture regarding the government's programme and devolution in particular: 'The sooner we are off this hook the better.' 68 As it turned out, the government lost the guillotine measure on 22 February 1977 with 22 Labour MPs voting against, and it was left to accept that it would have to think again on the way forward for devolution. 69 First, it would have to face a no-confidence vote in the House and in this context it needed to ensure support from whatever quarter it could find it.
This led Callaghan to sweeten the Unionists with a promise of a Speaker's conference over the Northern Ireland representation issue, a climbdown from his position prior to the guillotine vote. No formal agreement was reached, but three Unionists, including Powell, abstained in the vote of no-confidence which the government, supported by the Liberals with whom they did reach a deal, won comfortably. 70 Callaghan then kept his promise of a Speaker's conference, while placating the Liberals with a renewed commitment to devolution, this time in the form of separate bills for Scotland and Wales.
The concession of the Speaker's conference in effect removed any doubt that Northern Ireland representation would be increased; it now remained a matter of how many.
Notwithstanding its opposition to the proposal, and the sense of inevitability that now surrounded it, the SDLP was represented at the conference in the form of its leader, Gerry Before I came I was concerned that recent events gave some people at least the impression that there was a move towards integration ... by reason of the Northern Unionists voting with the British government in certain divisions in the House of Commons, by reason of the establishment of the Speaker's Conference the purpose of which is to increase the representation of the Northern Ireland members at Westminster. There was a feeling, then, that all these things might seems to point towards integration rather than devolved government and I was very happy to get the assurance from Mr. Callaghan that it was and remained the policy of the British government to have devolved government with power-sharing and that there would be no devolved government without power-sharing. He was very emphatic in this respect. Nationalist patience in Ireland, north and south, was sorely tested by the Northern Ireland representation saga, and there was much frustration about the prospects of peace being jeopardised for the government's short-term gain. Nevertheless, some Nationalist and
Republican reaction betrayed an inability to appreciate the political context in which the government found itself, or the way that the issue had become entangled with wider UK constitutional questions since at least the time of the publication of the Kilbrandon report.
Seán MacBride, a veteran Irish Republican who had acquired an international reputation for human rights causes by the 1970s, was quoted as saying of the decision to increase representation that it was 'a far more damaging assertion of Britain's intention to continue to assert her sovereignty in the six counties than anything that has happened so far'. 'It is a provocative indication', MacBride went on, 'that Britain will continue to exercise her domination over the northeastern part of Ireland.' 88 This was a measure of how far Irish Republicans and even some moderate Nationalists continued to frame the Irish question in terms of an assumed British 'imperialist' mindset that other evidence, whether political diaries and memoirs or government records of the day, overwhelmingly refutes. Clearly, the symbolic significance of the increase in Northern Ireland representation should not be underestimated in relation to the depth of division between Unionists and Nationalists at this juncture over the nature of the conflict and how to make progress towards peace. Equally, there is little that might be drawn from the political saga surrounding the issue to suggest that the Labour government desired the closer integration of Northern Ireland, and it was certainly regretful about the impact the controversy had on its relations with the SDLP. It was, rather, a complication among many others during an exceptionally precarious tenure of office, and a matter that could not be prevented from spilling out into other realms of policy. 
